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PROPOSAT FOR A DECISION
Ad.opting the annual report on the econonic
situation in the Comnunity and laying d"or^ne the
economic policy guid.elines for 1!ll
THE COUNCTL OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES,
Having regard, to the treaty establishing the European Economic Communityt
Having regard to Council Decision 74/tZO/nUC of 18 February 19?4 on the
attainment of a high d.egree of convergence of the economic policies of the
Member States of the Elrropean Economic Comnunity (1), anend.ed. by the
Council Decision 75/787/ffiC of 18 December L975 (2), and in partianlar
article {t
Having regard. to the proposal fron the Commissiont
Having regard, to the Opinion of the European Parliamentt
Having regard. to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Comrnitteet
Taking into consid.eration that, in adopting the Council Decision 76/646/EEC,
on 26 July 1976 (l) tire Council approved the analysis of the economic
situation set out in the Commrnication of the Cornnission of 23 June 7976
concerning in particular the preparation of the public budgets for 1977; that
according to this d.eci-sion, the Menber States pursue policies in conformity
with the guidelines on the preparation of the public budgets for ]-977 which
are specified. in the A::nex of the said Decisiont
Taking into consid.eration tbat the tripartite conference he1d. in Luxembourg
on 24 June 1975 camied. out a thorough d.issrlssion of the problem of employment
and stability in the Cornrrunity, the conclusions of which were given in a
joint statenent (4) ,
. 
(1) ot No t 61, 5.3.L974, p. 16
(e) o.l No L llo, 24.Lz.r97jt p. 52
(f ) o.l No L 22), 20.8.19761 p. 1.
(+) o.i No c LT3, 28..7.r)16, p. L
- 
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HAS AbOPTTD fHIS }ECISION
Article I
The Couhcil ad.opts the anrnral report on the economic situation
in the Conmunity shovrn arurexed. under I, If, III and. Lays d.ol,rn the
gtrtdelinee to be followed by each Menber state in its economic policy
tor L)ll, as shown airnexed. und.er IV and, V.
Article 2
this decision is ad.d.ressed to the Menber States.
FOREIfORD
Untler Artlole { of lts DecLslon 74/L20/WC of L8 tr'ebruary L974
on the attalnment of a higb degree of oonvergence of the economic
polloies of the Menber Statos of the Ehropea^n Econonic Oornmunlty,
as amend.ed by ite Deox.gioa 75/187/WC of tB Deoenber L975r t.be
Cornoilr acting on a propoeaJ. fron the Connission and. after
oon$rlting the Ehropean Pa,rll.a,rnent and the Econornic and. Sooia1
Conni.ttee, is required., during the f,ourth qrarterr to ad.opt art
anmral report on the econonio sttuatlon in the Conuunity and. to
set the econonlc poLioy guid.elines to be f,oLlowed by each llenber
State in the folLowing yes,r. Onoe the report has been ad.cpted by
the Counoilr the goverrurents mrat bring it to the attention of
their national parlia^nebts Bo that it nay be taken into accoult
in bu.d.get debetes.
The guldel.ines oonteined. in thle report nay have to be
ad.Justed. to take aooount of economic d.evelopftents when the Counoil
oarries out its subsequent examinations of the economic situation.
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f.
STTUATION
1.1. Itre nost severe post-h'a.r recession reacheal itg low point in the
Recovery under seconcl balf of 1975. The efforts matle withln the Commrnity and in
rayt but inr- coorclination with other lndustrialized oountries to revive cLomesticbalances
oontinue tlenand have been supported by spontaneous expansionary factorsr by
increased confidence on the part of ind.ivid.ual-s ancl firms, and by a
vigorous expansion ln international worltl tracle. The growth of tracle
has helped. to consoliclate the recovery, especially because the Comm:nity
and the other inclustrialized countriesr oontrary to what many had
feared, in general avoiclecl protectionist measures or nbeggar-ny-neighbourtr
polioies during the worLd reoession.
fhe uptuin ln d.emand. and output'has notr however, allowed
the d.ivergenoes in price ancl cost trend.s in Member States to be reducecl
sufficientl-Xr nor has it prevented. the reappearaJrce of balance of payaents
disequil-ibria in a nunber of oountries. The recent signs of an alnost
general slackening in the upward movenent of Labour costs arer lndeedt
encourag:ing, ht it is not certain that thi.s irnprovenent will continue.
Sesiilesl underlying infLation sti1l renains too strong. As for the
situation on the Labour market, it is inproving only slowly and in only
a few of the Menber States, whj-Le continuing to tleterlorate in nany
oountries conpared. wi.th the situation last year.
SJ-owing in !.2. The path of economlc activlty turned. upwards towards the middle
ra,te of
;;;";-r"" of l)lJ. Until the spring of 1976, industrial output rose verv rapi.dlv in
almost a1l- Menber States. 3ut sinoe then, however, its rate of expa,nsion
has lost a good. d.ea1 of nornentum turning to stagnation in soroe cases. fhis
pamse can be partly explained. by the loss of ilyna,nien ln oertain
sectors such as in stookchanges ancl denantl in the notor vehicle inclustryt
but i.s also dlue to the sLow growth of pSivate cons:.urption anil tho gontlnued.
wea,lgtess of flxed. investment.
Divergent
clevelopments
fron one sector
to another
Grolrbh rate of
5/" in t976
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The rate of recover;y in industrial output has differed. from
one sector to another. Gr,owth has been buoyant i-n the case of raw
mateirials, internediate g,cods, and consumer goods but has been
weak for oapital good.s (L). Overall, industrial output in the
Comrnrrnity in August 1!16 ,r'ras I@" up on its lowest level record"ecl
during the recessi.onr Ho.wever, it ts still about 4/o below the record.
level of 'llJ{.
Compared with the p:reced.ing six rnonths, and. at an annual rat,er
the Community's real gross domestic product rose by approximately
$/" in the second. haLf of 1975 and rv Grfl" j.n the first half ot L)lr|i
it will probably show an :i"ncrease in the rggion ot 4% j-n the seconrl
half of the year. For 197t5 as a whole, the growth rate is expected
to be sone J/o compared wi'bh a contraction of */" in t975.
?he improvernent in the econornic situation in the Comnrrnity hia.s
varied- in timing and strength from country to country. The annual rste
of expansion in real gross d.omesti.c product between 1975 and 1116 :nanges
between a,boul 3/" (Luxenborrrg and United Kingdon) and some 5/" (teaeteaL
Republic of Germany (Z). ltt the regional level these iievelopments have
resulted. i.n increased divergences between the most progperous and 'bhe
poorest regions in the Cornmunity.
1.3. In aeverel. Menber fitates, the economic recovery has brought to a
halt the ileterioration on the emplo;rment front. Almost everywhere, shori;-
time working has been largely elirninatecl' while the number of hours
actually worked have lengi;hened in some sectors. By contrast, the scope
for productivity pins aveuilable in the wake of the recession, and the
substantia] expansion in'l;he labour force in several countries has
hindered. any improvement els regards the number of who11y unernployeil.
The seasonally ad.justecl nunber of who11y u:renp1oyed.1 which
stood- at some J n1L1-ion at the end of last yeex, or {.flo
of the labour force, feI1 s1lghtLy ia the first half of the year,
(r)'see table 2.
(Z) See table 3.
Slowing ln
private
consurnption
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but it should be noted. that this inprovement is alnost enttiely
attributable to d.evelopments in the Federal Republic of Gernany
and !"rance. Si-nce the spring the nunber of who11y unenployed- has risen
as a result of the arrival on the Labour narket of a large number
of scb.col-1eavers, with the result that by August 4.9 rniLlion
people were out of work, or 4.6f" of the avaiLable Labour force
(seasonaLly adjusted figures) (f). tire nunber of young peopl-e
unemployed is at present (early auturnn) put at nore than two
million, a figure muoh higher than that record.ed. a year earlier,
notably due to the situations in the United Kingd.on ancl ftaly.
fn severaL Menber States, the nu-mber of women out of work has
also clinbed sharply in L976, because one result of the recovery
has been that persons mad.e redundant during the recession, who had
left the labour market, are nold seeking jobs once again. Generally
unernployment rates have renained substantially greater in the
economicalLy weak regions of the Conmunity than in the rnore prosperous
regi.ons, although in the latter there has been in soste cases a
reLatively narked. inorease in unenplo;rnent.
1".{. After'naking a zubstantial oontribntion at a'n initiaL stage
to the reversaL in the cycllcaL trend.s within the Conmunityr private
consumption has leen errpand.ing at a mqre nod.erate rate since
the b6giruring of the year. It is still- being pushed- up b{ a fal1 in
the savings ratio, whlch has returned' to its long'tern trencl leve1 in
several countries. 3y contrast, the elower growth in real d.isposable
inoorne has, in 11ost Member states, had. a da^npening effect on personal
spend.ing. The sLackenlng in the rate of increase in wages hasr in
aLmost aI1 countries, not been entirely offset by the rise in the
total rnrmber of hours work€d. In ad.dition, there hae been a less
rapid. erpansion in transfer income6. Eor 1976 as a whole, !'ranrce
will probably show the greatest inprovenent in real gross incone
per person in paid. enploynent; in ftbLand., the Netherland.sr Luxenbourg
and united Kingdon no increase or even a slight faLl ie expected.
Although personal_ spending has sti11 been boosted. by replacenent
need-s bulj.t up during the recession, particularly of rootor oarsr thetr
lnpaot is bound. to have Lessened- durlng the year.
(f) see table 3.
Following the high level reaohed at the beg:inning of the year,
private consunpti.on in the Community ls erpected. to orpand. in
real terns during 1976 by nore than 3%, as against just over
t2% in t97:r.
Investnent 1.J. In spite of the incentlves tntroiluoed and the gulte
cllnate stiLL
lukewarrn, general tenilency for wagers, expressed. as a proportion of gross
iLonestic product, to faLl, the propeneity to invest has renained.
weak in nost Menber Staters. fn fact, the inprovenent in proflts
has nostly been only gradual. and has nainly been'used. to reduce
the short-tern lndebteclness of buelnesaes. liloreover, in nost lnatuetries
produotlon capacity ie stlU not being used fuL1y, and there isuncertai.nty
as to the general business outLook. For the year as a whole, real
gross f,ixed. capital formation is e:rpeoteil to rise
only in Denroark, the Fecleral Republlc of Gernargr and. France, that is to
say generalLy in those comtries where investnent in building and
const:ruction has picked u'po fn noet other Mernber States, the volune of
fixed. investnent is expected to rernain below Laet yearts 1eveL, so that
the Comnunity as a whole ,ril1 record. a nod.est growth in thie demanri
conponent ot l*1" in L)16, following a d.esldhe cf 5V" fn 19T5.,
Recent slackening L.5. The factors, firrst apparent in I)IJ, naking for a slowd-ow:ain the rate of
infLatlon ln inflation and a greate:n convergence of d.evelopnents within the
Conrnrnity were abruptly checked Last winter. fhe increase in the
prlces of lnported agricu.ltural. good.s and raw alaterlals, to which
surrency d.epreciation has in sone cases contributed., hras a keSr fac.bor
ln the upsurge ln both producer and congumer prices in several Member
States. Sinoe Aprilr howeverr the conbined. inpact of nore firnd^amen-bal
factors 
- 
priloarily tbe sllowdowr, significa^nt in some countrles, irr
the rate of increase in leubour costs and favourable seasonal faotors 
-
hes helpedr a great deaL j.n some cases, to reduce the rate of inorease
of oonsuner prices.
Sharp
recovery in the
worlcl econol4f
. .. o,nd. in
international
trad.e.. .
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In the Comrounity as a whole it slackeneil to ahout B/" at an
annuaL rate fron April to August 1!J6r conpared with a rise
of about 14% fton Deoember 1975 fo ApriL L976. ft m'st, howevert
be assumed. that this iroprovenent will- not contj-nue tluring the
final roonths of the year, g:iven the rise in whoLesaLe priceE.
For the fu1] year, the increase ln consuroer p1ices in the Community
aan be put at over !@o, as against 12.4" in 1975. The antioipated.
ri.se of j/" in +Ue Fecleral Repgb1ic of Gersrasy compares wilh a 16/"
increase in the United Kingdorn and fron about 17 fo lB{" in Ireland.
an6 ftaly, with increases of between 9/" *d 1gy' leing reconded in
the other Mernber States (1).
L..1. In the early nonths of 1!J6, the United. Statest econorDy
continued to expa.ncl brislcly ancl tbe econonio upturn in
Japan beca,ne more firmly established.. In most of the non-mernber
countries in hrrope the recovery lagged several nonths behind.
that in the larger economies; it was boosteil by the expansion
in sales by these countri-es to the comrnunity. During the spring
and. sumer r0onths, output continueil to rise almost everywherei
however, the rate of this e:rpansion proved to be less zustained
than at the beginning of the year, particularly in the United'
states and Japan. since, Ln'l)16, the rate of growth in reaL gross
proiluct wil]. exceed.6Yf" in the United. States(2), it is expected. to
reach about ffi for the clevelopect countries as a whole
L.B. As output recovered-, the volume of the industri.alized
eountriesr imports rose strongly from the tiddle of 1975' Stock
rebutlding in these coqntries has trlggered. a greater clemanil for
raw nate?ials. Rrrchases of oil-r particularly by the United Statest
have begun to increase once again; this has further boosted' the
ourrerrta,ccountst$plusesoftheOPECcountries,whoseowrrimportshave
(f) see table 4.(z) see table 7.
.,r ftriggering
a recovery
in exports
Deterioration
in the paynents
balances of
alL the d.eficit
countries
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risen much more slowly s:ince mid-1975. The non-oi1-prod.ucing
developing countries are thernselves reaping the benefits of a
recovery in export demanrl and the rise in conmodi_ty prices.
Nevertheless, in spite o:[ this improvement, they are stil1
rurrring zubstantial curr,:nt accorrnt deficits which restrict
their scope for stepping up imports. Lastly, the purchases of
stat+-stading countries rrrould. seem to be ruarking tine. Overa11,
the volume of world- impo:nts 
- 
excluding the Conmuni-ty's imports 
-
will probably grow by around- 9{" in 1976 (-4" i" l-97j).
!.). &rport denand has played. an important role in the short-
term deveLopment of the r:conomies of the Cornmunity during both
the recession and the rer:overy. Accord.ing to estimates mad.e by
the Comrnissionts services on the net inpact of exports to the grolrb.h
of gross clonestic prod.uc:b, which take into account the effects of
both d.omestic and international trade multipliers, almost half of
the fall in the Comrnrnit;rrs reaL gross donestic product tn 1975
can be attributed to the sJ$uLtaneous contraction in trade among
the inclustrialized countr:ies while alnost a third. of the foreseeallle
ercpansion in 1976 is expectecl to be accounted. for by the grorth in
exports.:For each Member State intra-4ommrnity trad.e has a slight.Ly
greater impact than denarrd from the other OECD countries.
L.10. the Comrmnityrs trade d.eficit continued to increase durirrg ther
first half of L976 (1). ttor"o"r, the deficit is now increasing nore
s1ow1y with the weakening; of the initial surge of inports, and ther
reduetion in the rate of d-eterioration of the terms of trade. The
Cornrnrnityts surrent account deficlt has teen seriously influenced-,
in 1976,by the drought, and. it is expected. to rise to about $ T OCrO
nl11ion eonpared with a snrpLus of $ 500 nillion in tglS Q).
(f) See table !.(Z) See table L.
This overaLl d.evelopment marlcs considerable d.ivergencies as
between one country and another. For most of the d.eficit countries
d.ifferences in the d.evelopment of prices and. costs have been
reflected", since the beginning of the yearr in a d.eterioration in
exchange rates, the short-term perverse effects of which have again
aggr.avated" the d.ifficulties, in sorne casesr on the external- front.
In fact, the expected. d.eterioration in the Comnrunity's cugent
account baLance between J-975 and,19?6 will- be mainly attributable
to the deflcit countries, whose combined d-eficit is likely to have
roughJ-y doubled.
Ad.justments
short-tern
econonlc
policy. ..
... to contain the
widening of
public d.eficits
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II. TIIE ECONOMIC POLICT]OS ]MPIIMMilIED IN T976
2.I. The problem of the d.irection ancl intensity of conjuncturral
poLicy has becone nore <lifficult in I)f6, Tlne recovery has concealed-
onJ-y tenporarily the se:nious underlylng guestions sti1l to be so.Lved..
Since the beginning of the year the ilifferences persisting betwer:n
countries in price, cos'b and. balance of payments trend.s have
constantly led to f\rther strain on the foreign excharlge market vrhich'
d.espite the insufficien"b reiluction in unernpLo;ment, obliged. sevelnal
Merober States to make their short-terrn econonic policy stance
restrlctive. 
,
1o 1t fn August a.nd September 1975, important measures for zupporting
economic activity were introduced by five llember States. Earl,y in
1!16, similar limited me;e,sures in the bud.getary field were again taken
in the Comrunity. Since .Ularch the emphasis has, however, been 0n
decisions airaed at conta;ining public deficits. Ireland and ltaly in
partiarlar have been 1ed to linit their bud"get deficits as part o:fl the
a.ction to pronote flnanc:ial solidarity introduced by the Comnunit;y.
Measures airneil to restra:in erpenditure have also been taken in the
United Kingd.om. The economic upswing helped. to sLow d.own the growth
of public e:rpenditure fa:lrly generally, and in sotne cases on an
appreciable scale, and to increase revenue more rapidly than in l-9?5.
As a proportion of national incorne, bud.get deficits in a1l the
countries, except the Netherlands, will be loner than in the previlous
year. Fralrce and the Fed-eral Republic of .Germaryr are, however, thr:
only countries where the deficits will be reaLly substa^ntlally
reaucea (1 ).
(')u"" table 5.
More cauti-ous
nonetary policy
Sti11 rapid
growth of
llEritlity
Recovery of
interest rates
Strains on the
forei.ga €xclrarege
nark€ts
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2.3. In the autumn. of 1975, when the tentative signs of economic
recovery had- been confirned.r the d.eliberately expansionary
eharacter of monetary policy was changed to a cautious stanee. Since
last spring nonetary policy has followed a more restrictive ooulse in
most of the Menber States.
At the begin:ling of the recovery, the money supply had
increased. at a rapid. rate under the influence of hearry budget
deficits. Despite the introcluction of a nore cautious monetary policy
and. the reduction in the public sectorsr financial requirenentsr the
expansion has only slowecl- in a small number of cases. Until now
iLenand for personal cred.it has shor*n an appreci-able recovery.
roainly in the FeileraL Republic of OerlraJ$r and-, more recentlyr'
in the United. Kingdom.
Short-term interest rates had been falling in the Community
in 1975, but thls developmen! generally .ended in the closing nonths
of the year. The monetary unrest then qontributed. to reversing the
path of interest rates. In Denrmarkr ftaly and the United Kingdon 
-
short-teru interest rates reached. record levels at the beginning of
the autumn. As for longrterro interest rates, they have slightly
increased. since last spring.
2.4. fhe reLative stability of exchange rates recorded during
the recession ca,me to an abrupt end- early in 1976. Despite subsequent
ad.justnents to short-term econonic policy in the Member States whose
currencies were tend-ing to d-epreciate, the situation remained difficult
thoughout the sunnner. Only the J.irar foJ.Lonring the deposit requirement
inposeil oir purchases of foreign currency ancl other measures which
brought a rise in interest ratesr becalne firmer temporarilyrbut i-t was
then Subjected-to a further iLoWn1rarcL movenent. Ttre signtficance of
exchange rate strains ls aL1 the greater in that they occurred despite
large-scale central ba.nk zupport measures. Dring the first half of
1!f6 excha.nge rates between the dollar and the currencies withj.n the
Conrnunity exchange rate systen d.isplayed relative stabi-Iity. Since then
the latter have shown a tentlency to appreciate.
Search for a
eoci&l conserlsuq
to overcome
inflation
Active
poLioy
on the
labour uarket
*1.0-
2-5, The efforts nad.e by the .goverreraents to nod,erate the rise
in incomes and prioes benefited in sone Menber states fron the
support end cooperation of the two sid.ee of ind'stry; ln others,
helrever, notre otr reps nnnd.atory ueastrre' proved. unavoid.able.
After several years in r,vhich tages had noved up sharply, there
has been a dietinct elora6e61 ln the trend, Ln 1976, exoept 1n
FFance and ltalyr
2,6o Most lvlefinben Stai;ers have resorted. to a very wide range of
euplolment polioy instrurnents so as to make up for the rag befo'e
the recovery in the economic situation affectE the r.abour narket.
Tn genera[ tetrme1 polioy has contirued. to favour the protection of
inoomes of those uneruployed, the prevention of large scale redundancies
and' the seleo*ive ganting of, enpL0;ment zubsid.ies rrather than the
ipp:rovenent of professional trelnlng and of laboup mobj.li.ty.
-11_-
rrr, rHp EcoNolrrc 0urL00I( FOR 1977 ANp_ EcoNoMJc 3ollcI pFglryg
3.1. The very rapid. expansion which characterised. the initiaL
phase of the recovery j-n the Comnmnity has been succeeded. during
the last few months by nore mod.erate economic a,ctivityr owing to
the d.isappearance of certain stimuli.
This mod.eration suggests that the risks of a boom in the
domestic as well as in the prirnary-products markets have been avoidedt
creating an improved. basis for stable growth. On the other hand.t
there are uncertainties about future d.evelopnents which are at present
very difficult to assess.
3.2. A nr:rnber of factols suggest that the economic upswing will
continue:
- 
the most recent EEC surveys have confirmed. that consumer confid.ence
has strengthened.;
- 
social conflicts have become substantially less acuter while the
cooperation of the social partners is begirrning to bear fmit;
- 
the rise in prices and. in labour costs has beeome less rapidr except
in certain special casesi
- 
the productivity and. profits of firms have improved. in a number
of inrlustriaL sectorsi as a re$rlt of thisr the likelj-hood of a
recovery in d.enand. 'orlginating in industry has improved.;
- 
the improvement in worl-d trad.e is continuing. Most Member Sta.tes are
at present benefitting from the strong expa.nsion of world, imports.
3.3. The slowd.otrn seen in recent months could. thrrs be only
ternporaryl however, a more confid"ent assessment of the prospects for
a contirmation of the Erowth phase :.nto L)ll must depend" on the trend.s
vrhich emerge during the autumn. In any case it is accepted" unanimously
-L2-
wi.thin the Comnunity that greater stability of prices, a reduction
in baLance of paynents d.eficits a.rld a halt to the d.eterioration in
excha,nge rates are key cond.itions for the achievement of durable
growth.
' Several Menber States have recently introduced. - ln part to
contend with wictening bal.ance of pa;rments deficits - prograrunes to
fight infLation and rising costs, and also restrictive neasures in
the monetary field.. These d"ecisions caryy r,rrith then the risk of
braking the expansion of d.omestic d"emand. and.t sor of economic
activity. It is not yet possible to evaluate the inpact of these
stabiLization progranmes, or of actions of this kind whlch might
yet be introduced, on short-term economic d.evelopraents in the countri,es
invoLved. and in the other Menber States. The fragility of the e:rpansi,on
has its source essentialJ.y in the hesitant d-eveLopnent of investnent
d.emand", Fears of new monetary disturbances and. of a further rise in
raw materiaLs prices produce uneertainty which couLd. und.errnine the
confid.ence of businessmen a,nd. the growth of internationaL trad.e.
3.4. In present circurnstances it seens probable that the growth rate
of real gross d.omestic product on average in the Comnunity couLd. atta:in
4/, tn l)ll, provid.ing the favourable influences continue at work.
The voLume of private constlnption shouLd. continue to grow, given that
the increase in incones and the slowing of price increases reinforce
consurner confid.ence. In most Member States, investnent in eqr:.ipment
could begin to rise graduall-y and to an extent which will vary fron
country to country and. from one industry to another. Constnrction,
both of industrial and commercial build-ings and. of dwellings, will
also continue to expand., Stock fonmation wiII, in general, no longer
continue to stimulate output. In the majority of the Comrnmnity
countries, external trad.e is expected. to impart the greatest
stimulus to activity. kports to non-menber countries could. increase
in volume at the same rate as intria-Conmunity trad.e, that is by about
Lq".
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3.5. In the developed. countries outsid.e the Corornrnity, the
rate of growth of production in 1977 should be slightly above
the longen-term average. In the United. States, economic expansion
is like1y to contlnue next year but at a slower rate ( *1"). I
recovery of activity is expected. in Japan as well as in rnost of
the maller economles, in which the begin:eing of the recovery
was hesistant. A rate of growth of ! to ffi, of real gross domestic
product for the d.eveloped. countrles outsid.e the Comrnunity ean be
foreseen for 1977, as againsf ,Y" in 1975. Most of the deveLoped
countriesl with the exception of the United. States, can be excepted.
to expe::ience a mo:re rapid. gfowth in the volume of their irnports
next year, The progressive inprovenen! in the export revenues of the
noroil-producing developing countries should permit a recovery in
their imports. In totall the voLume of world. imports (exclud.ing EEC
imports but includ.ing those of the Eastern countries) should. increase
by a.bout B-9% rn L977 0). Moreover, one should expect further price
increases for industrial raw material-s in L977 t as a result of the
continued. upswing in world economic activity. In most regions in the
world, with the exception of those European countries hit by the
d.rought, the harvests of the principal crops appear to be relatively
good". The size of food price increases within the Community will thus
largely depend on the decisions taken und-er the agricultural policy.
3.6. Given the reserves of capacity which stitl exist in most
Member States, together with further ad.d.itions to capacity, the growlh
of total outputin the Community, estimated. at about $o, seems likely to
leadto onlyaslight increase in employment in 1977. The unempLoyment rate
in the Community could fal1 to a LittLe below 4% ot the labour force
which, for most of the Member States, would. not repregent an adeErate
improvement. Ttre number of who1ly unemployed. in the Comnunity would
sti1l be at least as high as in 1975.
(f) See table 7.
The outlook {'or the rate of inflation d.epend.s essentially
on the success of econornic policy and the atiitude of the sooial
partners. fn the absence of d.etermined action by the Member
States, already taken in certain cases, it is to be feared. that
Ln 19'17 the rise in consumer priees for the Corununity as a whole
*ould" be scareeLy less than the ra,te reoolded. for this year.
The repercussions of' the d.rought on agriculture and ar\y further
currency d.epreciations and inport price increases could, aocentuate
this problern.
Continued. inflation of this magnitud.e would be urracceptable.
Iilot only would. it und.ermine the economic recovery, but it would.
threaten the oohesion of the Co:mmunity and wou1d. give a durable
character to the d.ifferences in the d.evelopment of prices and. costs
within the Community.
3.7. l'l:e continuation of the economic recovery, the worsening of the
terms of trad.e and the delayed effects of the 1!f6 drought
will be refleeted again in 1977 by a d.eficit
in the balance of payments on surrr:nt account of the Conraunity. This
Ceficit will only be smaller than in the previous year if import
d.emand" in the d.eficit countries tend.s to slow and if worId d.emand.
mains buoyant. 'Ihe current account surplus of the OPEC countries
may grow rarger in \)ll, while the d.eficits of the non-oil-producing
d.eveloping countries and. the stats-trad.ing countries will tend to
decline. In these circurnstances thr: developed countries of the
Western worLd. rnust accept for l-97? as a whole a cument account d.eficit
greater than in 1pJ6, if stagnation of world trad.e, r*hich would.
particuLarly effect the Communityr:Ls to be avoid.ed. The efforts mad.e
by most Menber States to reduce their balance of payments d.efi-cits
could. thus meet with success only :Lf the other Corununity countries
reduce their surpluses, and. if d-eveloped- countries outsid"e the Comrnuni.ty,
more particularly the United States and Japan, aocept correspond.ing
d.eficits. Community solid.arity requires henceforth that the process
of ad.justment within the Comnmnity should. be helped. by :
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- 
the coordtnation of aggregate d.emand. mgnagement, with a view
to restraining the growth of consu-urption in the d.efici,t countiies
and strongly increasing irnport d.emarrd. in the surplus eountries;
- 
the provision of fund.s f,or financihg, if the adjustment process
within the community were to appear too slow, of if thr.e other
developed countries were not prepa:red. to aceept Large d.eficits.
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W Ti{E q'IDELIIIES FOR ECONOI{IC POLICY
A. General zuidelines
{.1. lghe governments, the representatirres of unions and. enployersf organi-'
zations in the nenber countrj-es, together rith the Comnissioq resolved, at;
the end. of June 1976, to iurplenent a coffinon stratery with the ain of reaching
the folloning medium-terrn targets (1):
- 
the simultaneous restoration of full enplo;rnent and stability as a matterr
of priority;
- 
the annpg,l rate of real growth of thei domegtic product of the Comnunity should'
averag€ arornd fl" in the period. frora 1975 to 1980;
- 
full employrnent should be reached by 1!BO;
- 
in all Member States the anrl:al rate of inflation shouLd be red.uced grach.rally
to between 4 and ,f" lV not later tharr 1t8O.
4.2. T1ne 6'ulclelinee for the nedtir:n-terrr whloh correspond. with these targets we:re
the subject of the fourth med.ir:n-te:n racononic policy prograrure, recently sub-
mitted. to the Cowrcil. The Comnr:nity must establishr for 1977, an economitc
policy which is compatible rrith these rnedir:m-terur targets and attempt to
reduce the wid.e tiisparities in the ratr: of increase of costs and prices beitween
member countries.
4.3. In 1976, menber countries were ab.Le to register some initiat success in
their stnrggle against the world"-wid.e:recession. ft is, howeverr to be de-
plored that the position in the labour narket has inproved only very slow-Lyt
that the rate of inflation has scaro ely fa1len, and that the divergencee in
price and cost trend"s in the Commwtity have hardly lessened.
As things stand. at present, the e,:onomic outlook for I97T suggests that
the rate of growth, in real terms, of gross donestic product of the Connunity
r+iI1 be sonewhat below the med.ir:n-terrn growth target.
(f ) .foint declaration adopted. at the c,onclusion of the
on enplqrment and stability in the Comnunityr held(O.J. of the European Comnunities, No L 229r P. Ir
Tripartite Conferetrce
on the 24th Jrune tl)'16
of 2o,8.L975) .
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The experience of the initial 
"i"S" of the recovery has served tohighlight, in several menber countries, the persistent nature of inflationary
expectations, of the growth of costg and of the external d.isequilibria, and.
the ha"ndicaps which these factors inpose on the growth of totaL denand. It
is posslble to inagine that, in certain menber countries, a conflict will
ariee, in l)ll, between, on the one hand, the need" to reduee the rate of
inflation and the balance of pa;mentg d.eficitr m{ on the other handr the
need to strengthen the econoraic recovery and to inprove the enployrnent
situation. ff the present weaknesg in economic growth happened to co.incide
with the effects of stabilisation prograrilres introduced in menber countriest
the resuLt could be a cunulative c ontraction of external d.emand.. It wouldt
however, be just as nistaken, in present circr:.nstances, to erpect that sone
gtinulus to demand and production would produce quick results in the battle
against wrenplo;ment. It is highLy unlikely that the risks inherent in a
poLicy of econoni.c ttstop-gofr and. in a worsening of the overall econornic
egtrilibrium would be ad.eguately rewarcLed by the short-term advantages of
a forced expansion of d.enand. Eventuallyl every nember state could. be
affected" by spread"ing stagflation, as the exampl-e of the worId recession
of L974-L975 lnas shown.
Ifr in the present situationt i1 becomeg inpossible to avoid. the threa-
tening corflict between objectives, the difficulties nay nevertheless be lessened:
- 
by overall coordinated. intervention both on a Comrnunity and world.-wide scale;
- 
by a better appreciation, by the social partners, of the macro-economic
poosibllities;
- 
by an active enplo;runent policy combined with neasures which encourage
structural change.
4,4 Wre overal,l approach to the Cornnrurity econoqy Ln L977 must be such as to
ensure that the e:cpansion in dqnestic d.emand, in those mernber countries where
there are no payments constraints and where a further slowdown in price in-
creases is like1y, is not hampered.. This could necessitate a rather cautious
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reduction , in bud.get d.eficits of ther countries concerned. and also the
use of specific measures for job creration and the provision of training'
places especially if, contrary to erpectations, investnent d.emand fails
to pick up reasonably vigorously in the months aheaa (1).
In. those nember couniries face<l with high und.erlying rates of infJ.ation,
sizable paJnnents d.eficitsl amd the l;hreat of a vicious circle of moneterry
depreciation and rising prices, economic policy must be used. to inpose
sqne consirainis on consuner d.emand and to make the most of the stinuli
provid.ed. by export denand. The starrce of d.omestic economic policy caJr
be less restrictive to the extent tirat export denand. proves to be stror:rger,
and that the red.uction in the rate of prlce and cost inflation is achieved.
more quick\r. Nonetheless, it woulcL be dangerous for al1 the
It[ember States to consid.er the expansion of their exports as the princip,al
factors supporting eeonomic activity in 1977.
4.5. ltt ahnost all member countries, the return to price stability shoul{
have high priority. As far as the uhited. Kingd.om is concerned., it is
envisaged. that the present phase of incomes policy r,tril1 continue to slow
d.own the rise in prices; in so far a,s thls policy is not thwarted. by new
exogenous d.i.sturbances. In France, the implenentation of the stabilisation
prograrure d.ecided last Septenber should lead. to a significant reduction in
the rate of inflation. ff member countries nad.e the necessary effort, the
annual rate of increase in consumer prices, on average for the Cornrnunit;y as
a whole, could be reduced. to a rate of 7 to B{"i.nL9TT and'the divergence
between rates of inflation in ind.ividual member countries couId. be sign:ifi-
cantly red.uced. fn fact, however, ihe d.eceleration of price irflation :is
likely to be less sharp than this, as ind.irect taxes and charges for puiblic
services are to be raised in certain Member States.
{.5. Monetary policy must play a central role in the steps to be taken -bo
recluce inflat;ionary expectations and to mod.erate cost and. price increastls.
fn alnost all nernber countries, the ,growth of the noney supply remains much
(f) ft is appropriate to recal\ in
States to set fite year public
directive of 18.2.1Q concerning
in the Comnunity, article 6).
tiris context, the obligations of Menberr
investment programnes (cf. the Council
stability, growth and. full enplo;mrent
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too fast to be consistent with the target of reducing the a^nnual rate of
price increase to between 4 and 5 per cent by 1!8O at the latest. The
prior notification by the Menber States of targets for the growth of the
noney supply should erert a stabilizing influence on companies and house-
hold.s in particular with regard. to their production, investnent and savings
decisions and. on the behaviour of the social partnels. For each l{,ember
$tate, the following conmon criteria for the expa"nsion of the noney supply
Ln l)ll should. be ad.opted., taking into account arqr expected. changes in the
velocity of circulation:
a real rate of groi'rth, congistent with medium tem targets, that would
allow an appreciable increase in the utilisation of capacity;
a rate of price increase that would. allow the rate of inflation to be
progressively red.uced, to an arrnual rate of change of between 4 to Jf"
by 1980 at the latest.
As the initial situation in each country is different, these quantitative
guidelines will necessarily also differ and. should be d.efined. in relation
to the various instn:ments of nonetary policy that are availabLe in the
various Eenber States (central bank noneyr M2 or Mr, or total credit). tf
need be, they should" be the subject of an ad.justment on the occasion of
the first exa.rnination of the econonic situation next March. The governments
and centra] banks must work closely together to assr:re as cl-ose a correspondence
as possible between the orientation of their budgetary and monetary policy
and the targets for the grow'th of the noney supply. fhe contiauoue and
progressive alignnent of the money supply growth targets for the various
nember states could contribute signf.fica,ntly towards stabilising both
present and anticipated. exchange rate movements.
4.7. the policy on conpetition is a necessary instrument in the fight againet
inflatlon. The proposal from the Commission ooncerned. with ensuring at the
Cor,ununity leve1 rnore systematic control of major mergers'(f ), should. be
d.iscussed. and. inplenented as soon as possible. It is al-so a suj.table time
to intensify efforts to improve the transparency of the market and the pro-
cess of price d.etermine,tion particularly through consumer informa.tion.
(t) rroposal
mergers.
for a regulation (nnC) to the
Doc CoM (Z:) fzfo final of 18 Council on the control ofJul-y 1973.
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{.8. In order to be able to reduce ther large budget deflcits in some
Ifernber States, lt is necesFary to increase ind.irect ta:cation, as is alread;r
foreseen in some Member Statee, and.1 i-n certain cases, to allow an ad.justment
of publ.ic sector oharges to reflect the increases in costs alrea{y sustained..
lfhe effect of these measures on pricest 
- 
at least those whieh represent highe:r
inilireot fiscal oharges 
- 
shouldl. not be conpensated. for in wage and. sa.lary
increases. This implies changes in ther ind.exation provisions for wages and
other incomeg in certain countries.
4.9. The reoovery of investment constitutes, for all the Menber States,
the essential problem as far ag the strengthening of donestic d.enand, in
1977r and the creation of emp1oJrunsnf, o,pportunities, are concerned. Govern:nent
measures in this area can only have a Linitecl scope and effect. An adequate
inprovernent in the profitability of enterprises and in sales, both innedirateltr'
and over coning years, can alone ensur€ a continued. expansion of fixed. investment.
The investnent clinate will be d.eteruined by the attitudes of the social
partners in the course of the forthcoming renewal of coLlective agreements.
The roon for manoeuvre fornaoro-eeononic policy wiLL be the greater to
the extent that the social partners have taken account of maoro-econonic impe:ra-
tives. Wage and. salary agreenents should be reached. taking into account,
not past ratesl but rather the target rates of inflation. In circr.mgtances
in which actual inflation exceed.g the 'target, ad.clltional cwrpensation ghorrld
be ad.ded. to the agreed. settLement. Incmes policies should. include elenents
of a policy on the distribution of wea.lth.
4.1o. Ihe emplo;ment situation should. i.nprove as a resuLt of increased.
capacity utiLisation. However, at a leuter stage in economic d.evelopment,
this iutprovement will be hindered. by ttre effect of certain factors. rn
all Member States, the working population will grow at a faster rate than
previousLy due to d.ernographic changes. Or the other hand, in the present
phase of the Tecoveryr the hiring of wo,rkers is ad.versely affected. by the
uncertainties which surround the econornic outlook and by the unfavourable
effects of measures designed. to nake th,e shedding of rabour nore d.ifficult,.
As the use of general budgetary measureis to stimulate the econony carries toogreat a risk of inflation, the inprovement in the enploynent situation musi;
be sorght essentially by a restructuriryg of governnent expenditure 1n favour
of outlays which permit some d.irect or jLnd.irect stimuLation, as sel-ective
as possible, of job-creating investment, The creation of new jobs and. of
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training places could be temporaril;ir encouraged by employment premiums
ad.jueted. to take account of the regiona,l situation. But it woulcl be mis-
taken to seek to counter the needed. ad.justrnents by means of subsid,ies or
protectioniet xneasures, All- Member States shoultL d.evelop ernploynent
policy (retraining assistanoer professional training, labour mobility, etc.)
in order to gradualLy reduoe gtructuraL r:nenplo;ment and to facilitate the
ad.justment of workers in certain professions alxd in certain age groups
to the changee that have occumed'
4.11. Global regulatory instrunents are no longer sufficientrby themselves
to conduct sinultaneously the fight against inflation and unemplo;mentt
whllst bringing about the nunerous structural changes r+hich are required.
These changes have become more and more necessary in the last few years.
In countrieg with d.eficits, the red.istribution of resources in favour of
exports must be continued. fn virtually all the countries of the
Connunity, the long-terrn trend toward.s a weakening of investment by
private firrns should. be reversed. at the expense of consumer expenditure
and" it will be necessary to reduce the relative importance of public
expenditure and wage costs which have shown excessive growth. The
strtrctural changes wil1 be needed w'ithin the Communityr in the
relationships r+ith countries which supply raw materiaLs and with the
less-developed countries. Tbe solution to the problens of energr and
of the environment, the fund.a,mental changes ln the relationship of prices
an6 exchange rates, as well as the basic cond.itions of the world econor\y
will mean intensive reoourse to regional and sectoral- factor mobility.
Stnrctural poJ-icy will have the task of stimrlating transfers from
stmctural-ly weak to strong sectorsrwhile the slans on the Community
institutions will be to facilitate these transfers at a Cornmunity 1evel
and. to engure that they are coord.inated..',The fourth programme of med"ium
term economic policy of the Comrnr:nity should. constitute the frame of
reference for the realisation of the structural and. social reforms in
Member St&tes.
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4.!2. Given that the recovery is sti1l fragile and the need. to redu.ce
budget d.eficits, it is of the utnost importanoe that expenditure on
regional d.evelopment, as mmch at the national as at the Community leve],
geographic viewpoint j"s most like1y to resolve the problems of stnlctur'al
unempioyment. So as to preserve the cohesion of the Comnunity and. to rnove
on toward.s further integration in a situation of weak investment,
commrnity regionar policy should be strengthened. both as regard.s its
financial means and. as regards its legulatory instnrments. The public
erpenditure policies of the Menrber Sitates shouLd. be d.eternined with
more account taken of their 1ikeLy impacts on regional development and.
in such a way as to increase their erffectiveness at the Comnmnity 1eve1,
- 
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B. 1[he pnriclelines for Menber States
fn Dennarkr the d.eterioration in the current balance of payments,
with. the deficit reaching 5r00O nillion kroner in the first haLf of
the year, and. the prospect of the renevral of wage a;rd. saLary agree-
ments have led. the authorities to reinforce the alreadv restrictive
stance of economic oolicy ancl.i in particuLar, continue to maintain a
strict inoomes policy. The measures taken in August aim basicall.y
to linit the growbh in norainal incomes and. costs fur the tr^ro coming J,pars
and. restrai-n- strictLy the expansion in consumer demand..
Although a slowd.onn in innports and. a growth in exports can be expected.,
the latter, which d.epend.s on the b'tro;rancy of worJd. trad.e, nay not
be sufficient to give an adclitiona.l impetus to private investment. Thus
growth may be heLd back, reaching at most 3/" for 1977 as a whore. For
this reason the emplo;naent situation couLd. tend. to r{orsen.
Given that the increases in salaries . and other incomes
shouLd. aot exceed, g/, for each of the next two yearsr such a framework
wilI have acLcLitional mod.erating effects on consumer price'i-ncrea.ses, which
for 1977 as'a whold should be below B/" (:-nc]:uding changes in indirect taxation).
Bucl.getary policyr used as a supplementary instrument to incomes
policyr reLies principally on erevere increases in ind"i-rect taxation as
wel.l as cutbacks in current anct capital expend.iture. However, conjunctural
d.evelopnents could. Lead. to a lack of buoyancy in receipts as well as to
supplenentary expend.iture. Ttrus, in ord.er that the ctefici.t for the
1977/78 financial year does not exceect the norm of 11r5OO million kroner
fixed" lest June it will be necessary to ensure that expentLiture which is
not autonatically linked. to conjuactural d,evelopnents is maintained. vrithin
the appropriate linits.
Having regard. to this objective, monetary policy should end.eavogr
to limit the expansion of donestic liquidity (UZ) to a rate of gror,rbh slightly
lower than that expected. for gross d.omestic product in value (t t to t{" in
1977). Ir thie respect it shouLd end.eavour to limit the monetary creation
of the Sovernment and. naintain the ceiling on bank lencling within tight
limits in such a btry as to encourage firms to borrow externall_y. rn
ad.d.ition, cred.it policy should be flexible and selective, by giving
priority to export sectors.
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In the Federal Republic of Germauny the economic revival, which had
developed. considerable momentum in the initial phase, has continued at a
calmer pace in the past few months. Allter slowing d.own a little in the su.fllmer1
i-nvestment d.emand. has picked up again recently, and export d.emand has conti-nu,ed
to provid.e a very vigorous $tirnrlusGGp'owth in private eonsumption, on the
other harrd., 1s still sluggish. Stockbuild.ing too, has been less buoyant.
Wi-th expend.iture on consumption 1lke1y to rise and export d.ernand buoyan-br
erpansionary foroes will probably strengthen again in the near futurer.
However if stead.y econornic growth is 1;o be maintained., it is essential thet tl:e
d.istinct improvement in company 
_profi.ts be safeguarded.l andl
sustained by favourable sales prospects, to be ref'lected in a lasting inorease
i-n investment activity. In the circums;'bances it should" be possible for reral
GNP to grow by an average of at least 5/" ," L977. Even und-er relati-vely
favourable conditions for growth, the structural problems on the labour market
will ease only grad.uerlly, so that selective measures are still necessary to reduce
d,isequilibria in certain sections of' the labour market. Despite a further
ri-se in demand. al-l groups involved. in business activity should continue t;heir
efforts to curb the upward movement oll prices. An attempt should. be mad-e, on the
basls of the stabilization 
_achieved so far, to restrict the average increrase
in consumer prices tn L977 to 41.1" at i;he most.
The appropriate target for the expantsion of central bank money should- \
be bel-ow the rate of growth in value c,f gross d.omestic proctuct (ylfirbecause of
the increase in the veLocity of circuLationr and. shoulcl take into account
the Level of Liquiclity in the econony at the end. of 1975.
With the econony rnoving further ahead., the policy of reduoing the h.eary
stnroturaL d.eficits of the public authorities, particularly the Federal
Government a"nd. the Linder, introd.uced in L975, shouLd. be continued. cautiously,
thus gradually creating nore roon for the expected. increase in the private .
sectorrs financing requirements. fn tz'ylng to inprove the bud.get structur,e,
care should al-so be taken to see that public investment in real te:rns d.oes no1
go on falIing. The planned. spend.ing poLicy and the increase in revenue, mainly
due to the economic upswing, shouLd b:'ing the combined. Federal- Governrnent
and Lind.er d.eficit 
- 
not inclucllng ther planned. increase in vaLue-ad.d.ed" tax 
-
to well below the a.rnount, sone DM 5o ooo nill,!.onr'erqreoted. for 1976.
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In &948, the rnajor diseEritr:ibria which appeared in the course
of the past recession have not yet been elim:inated..
The ooatlnued. ,searoh for higher reaL d.isposabl-e income. both by salary
and non-salary earners, l.,rhil-e the national product is groruing J.ess irapidly
is stil.L. generating qapid. incroases in costs. ftre rate of price
rises no longer seems to be falling below its present, unacepptablet
l-evel. Or external markets, the resulting deterioration in competitivity,
on top of certain exogenous factors, is aggravating the trade d.eficit
and so putting pressure on the franq thus reinforcing domestio
inf Lati onary pr€sgoPes r
The recovery in gror,rth has not brought with it a solution to
thesd problens. , A oautious sta,nce has been generally ad.opted. -r
reseffe, with' negard. to consunption and a rapid. incr:easq in
liqaid. saving, and sluggC-shness'in investment being the most noticeable
exanples. Thus, a return to balanced. and. durabLe growthr particularly in
areas of costs and employarent, wiJ-l necessitate a reorientation of economic
and- social policy d.esigned. to encourage confid-ence, by cutting back price
rises and. restoring external equilibrir:n, and satisfying aspirations for
a nore just d.istribution of income.
The series of measures adopted. recently can point the French economy
toriard"s a marked. slowd.or,rn in inflation and. a re-establish-ment of external
eErilibrir.un. Ind.eed., they should permit:
- 
a quite rapid. limitation in cost increases,rcure4tly the principal source
of infLation, by liniting the overall growth in incomes;
- 
a recovery in investnentl
- 
a FroSessive return to Government bud.get equilibrium and. at the sa.ne
time a red.irection of public expend.iture and. a transformation of the
tax systen aimed at supporting eoonomic activity;
- 
the inprovement of the financial position of the social securitl/
systenl
- 
a regulation of the rate of noney creation in such a way as to avoid.
, arg' restricttve effec-b1
- 
a limitation in inports by cutting back on oiL purchasesl
- 
a start in the restruoturing of the tax systen in ord.er to bean rnore
heavily on higher incomes and begin (ty u.reduction) to tring the rate
value ad.deil- tax into line with the average applied in the Conmrnity as
whole.
nf
a
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0vera11, these neasures are l-ikeLy to result in a less rapicL
development in final internal d.emarrd. : in thie event the rate of
increase in gross domestic product in real terns of ffi in 1977 sought
by the French Government wiLl be more difficult to reach. The opportu.-
nities for a considerabLe red.uctiorr in the rate of increase of prices
exist; the increase should. not exceect 7 to &/, on an annual average
basis, which is consistent with a tffi increase in the course of the
year. Finally, the improvement should be eqr:ally marked" in so far as
the balance of paynents on cument accorrnt is concerned.
ft is irnportant that this plan be put into operation with t[eter-'
nination and continuity. The effer:tive increase in central governnenl;
, expenditure should not exceed. 1{" and, if necessary the appropriate
measureet shouLd be lnplenenteet in ,rrder to prevent thls norm being erceeded
by the l-ocaL authorities. The guirlelines set for nonetary creation irt
1977 (M2 | +12.Jf") sho:ulcl be respercted. Finally, action ained at
ad.;usting the tax structure toroards greater equity is ind.ispensable.
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Ia I@1 growth shoulcl continue in the coming monthsr becauge
of a relative}y sustained progression of prirrate consu.rnption and. exports
arrcl rtespite a persistent weakness of private investment. For 1977 as a
whole the real growth rate of gross d.omestic product coulil be aror:nct 3f.
Therefore, the empJ.o;rment situation should. onLy improve slowly ancl' the
r:nernplo;rnent rate could. renain higfi. ALthough weakening somerorhat from
the mi4dLe of the year the factors behincL the rise in prices wiLl remain
r:ncLoubtetl.Ly relatively important, the clelayecl effect of the depreoiation
of the pound. coming on top of the growth in internal costs. Despite a
sl.ower progression in the voLume of inports, the current baLanoe of pay-
ments cleficit is r:nl.ikely to fall.
Under these cond.itions and with the aim of inproving emplolment in
the longer term, economic poLicy wiLl have to be d.irected. primarily at the
fund.anental probl-em of cost increases. To this end. a strict inoomes
policy shouLd. be implera'ented. with, as its objective, a substantiaL mod.era-
tion of the rise in wagee, salaries ancl other incones in the eourse of
the year. This wou1d. imply a year-to-year rise, which, incLud.ing the
carryover effect of increases grantecL in 1976t shouLd. not exceed 1q".
Such a development would. pernit a reduction in the inflation rate for the
year as a whole to around 1)$ and. fo 1$ for the final guarter of the
year. ft will also be essential to set out now the Lines of a more
restrictive income agreement for 1978.
Bud.getary policy wilL have to naintain, in this contextr the restric-
tive orientation given to it in 1976 a,nd. ensure notably tlat the net borrow-
ing requirement does not exceed. about f,700 nillion in 1977 t thus registering
further relative decline, This guideline inplies a strict limitation
in the rate of gror,rbh of expenditurg which should be substantially below
that of gross d.omestic product i-n valueror, should the occasion ariset
by further fiscal measures.
fn order to contribute to the reestablishment of eguiLibriunt
monetary policy shouLtl aim in 1977 af keeping the increase in the noney
supplyr(Ul) rbelow that expected. for gross domegtic product in value (!6f").
Such a d.evelopment r.rould be faoiLitatecL by the J.ese rapid grow-th in the
financing reguirement of the public sectorr given that a sufficient
proportion of these needs can be financed. by non-nonetary D€&ItEe
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In lta1y' the conjunctural recovery progressed markedly in
the first half of the year and. during the sunmer of I)16. Enployment
increased. and. capacity utilisation has been rmch higher. At the sane
time, however, price rises have conl;inued. at a too rapid. rate and in
the first half of the year the balarrce of paynents suffered a very
s'ubstantiaL deterioration. Al-though the balance of payments was again
in surplus in July-August, principaiLly due to seasonal factors, and
the price momentum slowed. d.ome in the midd.Le of the year, external
and internal equilibrlum, as reflecibed in the new lira crisis at end
September/beginning October, remained. extremely fragile, while
unemployment only fel1 slowly.
There is no d.oubt, if free rein were left to the spontaneous
growth of internal denand., that there would. be a risk of the reappe&xe,rlc€
of very strong strains on the balanoe of payments. Und.er these cond.itj.ons
and. when account is taken of the lolv level of official foreign exchanger
reserves, the balance of pa;,nnents constitutes a d.ominant constraint
for econoroic policy. Accord.ingly poilicy should. be extremely pnrd.ent
and. aimed., by an appropriate d-osage of conjuncturaL and. structural
measures, at keeping within narrow lLimits the growth of internaL
demand. while at the same time encout:aging those investments which
reinforce ltalian international competitivity and reduce dependence
on imports. This would. have at the same tirne beneficial effects on the
d.evelopment of employment. In ad.d-iti-on, housing investment, which is
labour intensive and. requires relati-vely little imports, should be
supported..
In ord.er to lay the foundation of a durable and bal-anced. growth
of production and empJ-o;ment, it is also essential to ruod.erate the
growbh of unit production costs. fn this context it is necessary to
put into motion an incomes policy ai,ned. at stability which would also
have as a task the adaptation of the present system of wage ind.exation.
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In the area of public financer the conjunctural necessities as
well as more long terrn considerations, set a particularly rigourous
fra,mework for bud,get management. It wiLl- be necessary firstly that
the ceiling of l3rB00rOOO miLLion lira, set by the Council last March
for the net bomowing requirenent of the freasuryr be strictly
respected.. Ar4ything above this lirnit wou1d. create the risk of
bringing with it a zuppLenentary and totaLly il}-tined growbh of
the money zupply. For L977 the net bomowing requirement of the
Treasury should- remain within this limit in absolute figures and.
in so d.oing reduce further and substantially its magnitud.e in relation
to gross d-omestic pro.duct. To this enct it wi.Ll not be enough to
inprove the effioiency of the fiscaL system by acceleration the
coLlection of agears and. intensifying the ca.npaign against tax
evasion. SeLective increases in taxes and. prices of public services
are also necessary to increase State receipts or reduce expenditure
on subsid.ies and.rat the same timer lut a brake on certaion consuinption.
Other savings should. be Looked for on the cunent expend.iture sid.er to
compensate partial).y for zupplementary charges, related. notably to the
industrial- ad.aptdtion plan and the increased assistance which will
have to be given to local authorities and- which, as far as possiblet
shouLd- correspond" to lmprovements in ad.rninistration. Tt will be
essential in arry case to aim to bring the rate of increase of bud.getary
expenditure markedly below tine zJf" expected for 1976. ft will also be
necessary to reduce substantial-Iy the proportion of Central Bank
financing in the d.eficit.
In add.ition, in anticipation of the usually d,ifficult period at
the end. of the year, the monetary authorities should. ensture that the
trend. towa.rds a particularLy rapid. expansion in liquidity is thwarted-
sufficiently in ord.er to avoid. serious d.ifficulties on the foreign
exchange market. ft is also necessary to take account, by appropriate
means, of the effect on Liquidity of the progressive reductionr recently
authorised. by the Comnission, of the obligatory d.eposits amassed- with
the Banca d.'lta1ia for purchases of foreigR currency.
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lfhe broad. version of the money supply (Mr) stroulcl not be allowecl to
grow by more than 18 to 1fl" between L976 and L977. In addition, it seens
neces'Earyrhaving regard notabl.y to the d.ifficult situation of the balance
of paynents, to keep interest rates well above the rates ruling a,broad.
fhe rneaer:ree recentLy adopted. and. announced. by the ltaLian authori.-
ties show that they see fuL3.y the necessf,rty of d.ireoting economi.o policy
on the lines traced. abover $hese measures inply, prinoipal.Ly, an increas,e
in taxes and pubLic senrice prices of some 4r00Or00O miLLion lirar half ,cf
which would. be d.eployeel in red.ucing the budget d.eficit and the remainder
in increasing investnent and empLo;ment. It is indeed essential to achie've
such a reduction in the budget deficit and necessary to inprove the struc-
ture of budgetary expenditurer bX reserving as much as possibLe for invest-
nent purpos€$r It is also advisablel that these neasures are reflected in
a narked reductlon in the reLative phare of nonetary fina,ncing in the builget
cleficit.
Ilacl.er these eon*itions, the grawth of gross d.onestio produot in
volune between 19?6 antt 1.977 wlLL be neoeesarily a lot less rapitl than
that between 19?5 and. 19?6. At the sane tine the riEe in consumer prices
shou!.cl be LinitecL to a rate equaL or lese *han that of 1976, which, when
aooount is taken of the effect on pri.ces of increases in the prices of
publio senrices; inpl"ies a sl.owdolrn i.n the ;underlying inflation.
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In the Net.!rc4994fu where economic activity levelled off in the
first haLf of 1976 and where unernployment continued to rise rlrntil the
autumn, the med.iun term employrnent outLook is unLikely to improve unless
the rate of increase in labour costs slows dowr and. productive investment
becomes more profitable. Conseqrently, the main economic policy goal
mrst bej the establishment of the cond.itions for a significant turnaround.
of the recent trends in these areas. In 1977 a growth in gross d.omestio
product of about 4b p"r cent, an increase in consuner prices not higher
than f per cent and. a rise of B to 8.5 per cent in lilage earnings per
head. 
- 
goal-s consistent with those of the national authorities - wouId.
si"multaneously irnprove the med.ium tern outlook and. reduce d.ivergences
i+ithin the Cornmunity.
Since the curuent level of unemployment is Largel-y attributable
to structural factors and cannot be reduced. by overall measures to stirnulate
d.emand., budgetary policy should aim at stimulating investment and. consequently
emplo.yment. This would necessitate a gradual return to a tighter budgetary
policy, Tiris implies, for L977, a stabilisation of the net borrowing
requirement at about l2 thousand. million guilders, representing an appreciable
reduction in proportion to g"oss d-omestic product. Sinoe further increases
in the tax burd.en are to be 1imited., this objective I'rill need. to be attained.
mainly by cutting back the rise in current expend.iture and, in particulart
social transfer pa;rments.
Resurnption of stricter bud.getary policy would. have two adva.ntages :
firstly, it woul-d. facilitate the financing of firmsr whose own ressources
(exoept in the enerry sector) are still well short of actual need.s, and
second.ly, it r,rou1d. enable the authorities to in'rplenent a monetary policy
d.esigned- to encourage capitaL movements as a counterpart to a substantial
current account surplus. This policy should permit the monetary authorities
to limit the increase of d.onestic liquid.ity to no more than 11 per cent
in 1977 on an average arueual basis.
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h Ef&$4, where economio activity seems to have marked tirne
since last spring and where recent rises in the prices of raw naterials
and. certain agricultural prod.uctsrtogether with probable future increases in
wa6e costs, point to the d.anger of,a new infLationary surge in consumer
prices, economic policy should. aim at a growbh in gross d.omestic product
of about 4* p"" cent and at ke'eping t;he j:rcrease in con$rmer prices'
belorv B to 9 per cent.
Srrch a development a.Ione, would. make it possible, in fact, to remove
the threat that stitl exists to onplo,yrnent and. to the eErilibrirrn in the
foreign exchange marketsri
Since this objectivo cannot be attainetL by mea,ns of bud.getary policy, at
least in the cument situation, efforts should be pursue4 
-especiall;y
when the effeots of the eoonomj.c rocovery progralnme come to a^n end. 
- 
to
adapt income formation mechanisms to the essential requirements of an open
economy operating und.er the oonstraints set by close nonetary cooperatio::
with other Menber-statesr It is of importance that the sacrifices imposetl
be shared. fairly betwean the various socio<conomio groups.
Bud.getary and. taxation polic;y must gradually be adaptod. toward.s
med.ium-term objectives. As sources of finance are alreafir linited.,
tbis appnoach wouldl. implyr for 1977 t a d.6finite sl-owdown in the ris e
in expend.iture and a reduction in rel.ative terrns in the net
borrowing reguirement. within this llramework, the net realised.
borrowing requirenent of centraL gov€rrnment shoulil not exceed.
FB 145 thousand. mill-ion.
Qy making it possible to reliax the restricitive monetary msasurrls
adopted. in lpf5r this relative d.ectinrr in the borrowing reguirement woulcl
be likely to facilitate the financing of private inrrestmentr fhus strioterr
bud.getary control might well contribu'be to equilibrium on the exchanges
and. reduce the d.ifferences in rates o:f inflation for cor.mtries within ther
nscakeno Against this background, it wou1d seem appropriate that the total
rise in lend.ing to household.s and. enterprises in the course of 19?T be
kept below 223 thousand. million fra^ncs (reprosenting an inorease of some
lJ per oent from end 19?5 to end L9T7).
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fn Luxembourg, the extrlansion also seens to have lost a little
momentum in recent monthsr Owing to the prospeot of a relatively good.
level of corporate investment and private consunption, the vplume in-
crease in national expend.iture shoulil be d.istinctly higher nert $€&rr
E:cports should. also continue to e:cpand. appreciably, but tho steel in-
dusiry will not benefit very much, as its sales are likely to remain
relatively weak.
Within the framework of a convergent economic policy for the
Community as a whole, Luxembourg could eryect a growbh rate of gross
domestic prod.uct of about & p"* cbnt in L97l and. shourd ain a linlting
the rate of increase of consumer prices to B per cent. jn these circum-
stances, the selective measures taken in L)lQ and I)lJ to sustain acti-
vity and help ernployment could. be gradually phased. out, whilst bud.getary
policy should. be adapted. to m6d.ium-term objectives and. to the availabi-
Iity of funds giventho likely growth of governrnent revenue;
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Economic activity in the llijS,$-jCtrEdom continued to recover in L)16, le,d" by
strong gror.r-bh in e:cports and a tun:rounri in stockbuilding. The rate of inflertion
was ccnsiderabiy lower than j-n I975t but the underl"ying rate remained. virtual.ly
'unchanged. during the year, largely as a result of increases in conmodity prices
an4 the sharp fall in the sterling exchange rate. Partly becamse of the up-l;urr:
in economic activity, the current accou:nt of the balance of paynents renainetl in
substantial deficit. Unemplo;rment, howr:ver, contintred. to increase.
The Govemment refrained frorn general reflationary measures which might have
weakened the bafance of pa;rments and aggravated i.nflationary pr€ssur€s, and,
notg.ithstanding the large public seetor bomowing reguirenent (PSBR), budgeterry
policy could be regard.ed as being sligbtly restrictive. Indeedt the net tax cutst
a,nnounced. in April for' the fiscal year I)'16h7, Ua not redrrce the overall tax
burden a,nd., in addition, the direct tani element of the package Has lsrgaly nnadb
conditional upon an agreement with the trad.e unions (reached" ir,Ju.ne) on ach:Lewing
sufficient restraint in vra,ge and salary increases in the twelve months to JuJy L977.
Despite the Governmentrs relatively cautious economic policy and the enoou-
raging trends in the first few months of the yearr both for inflation and the
balance of pa;rments, sterling weakened considerably during the period March '-
early June. In response to this crisi.*r *n?rtovertrment anno:r-ced on ? June a
short-tern cred.it stand-by of $ 5.3 billion\'/, followed by a progranme of ptnblic
expend.iture cuts and. increases in social security contribrrtions announced on
22 JaLy. These noves uere designed to restore confidence and to underLine tlne
Governmentts determination to control the level of putrlic expen*iture.
Renevrecl pressure on sterling in Se,ptenber ledthe Chancellor of theEkclequerto
aJrnounce on 2) Septernber the UK Governn,entrs intention to apply to the Internatic'na1
Monetary F\rnd for its renaining credit tranches rrith the fund. to benad.e availabl:.
Notwiths.tand.ing the weakness of the sterling exchan€F rater the Goverrrnerntts
overall economic stratery, by helping to r"educe inflationary expectationet hail
considerably inproved. the prospects for a period of sustained econonio growtlt.
Between 1976 and. !977 t real gross d.omes'tic product should grow blr a.bout $o. As
thi.s rate of gowth is not expeoted. to exceed, by more than a small narg'inr 1;he
trend rate of increase in productive potential and as the supply of labour could
are11 oontinue to expand in the short-term, the outlook for unenplo;rnent in tlte ne:rt
twelve months is particularly uneertainl bowever, a substantial fa11 in the -Level
is unlikely to occur. The Goverrrunentts ind.rrstrial strategr shCIrId go sone w{d}t
towards easing the unenplo;ment situation and raising the level of industrial Jmreshd.
(t) lrra.nged. with the Centr.al Banks of the Group of Ten (except lta1y), Sr*itraerland
and the Sank of Interrnational Settlements.
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The Governrnent should give priority to achieving a further reduction in the
rate of inflation and should, in particular, ain for a annual average :rate of
increase !n prices in 1977 of no more tha.n 11/o, with a decereration
as the year progresseso Such an objective, combined. with the need. to improve -the
balance of paymentsr mea.ns there wilL be no scope, in the near future, for a^ny rnove
to a reflationary stance of budgetary and nonetary policies. Indeed, g:iven
the size of the public sector d.eficite now foreseen tor L977/78n even the level
of demand. forecast tor 1977 could. lea,d to problems of financing and resource
aLJocation, with the da,nger of renewed inflationary pressures, as the recovety
proceeds.
An inpcrtant elenent of the Goverrunentrs stratery for reducing ihe rate
of inflation rnust be the continued redu.ction of the PSBR. Therefore, the
Governmentrs July neasures are to be welconed to the extent that they feduce
the official forecast for the PSBR for the fiscal year 1977/18 to a maximsn
of L ! billion. However it should, be possible to aim for a lower limi.t
During the past year, the Governrnentrs policy on incomes has played an
important role in bringing down the rate of inffati.on. ff further progress is
to be nade 
- 
itself a prereguisite for an improvernent in enployment prospects
in the longer tern 
- 
some form of incornes restraint will continue to be necessary
after July 197?. fhis corld take the form of an incomes policy that includes
sorne limited provisions designed to alleviate the anomalies in the stmcture of
relatj.ve wages that have occumed over the past two years. Decisions on the broad
principles of such a policy should be determined in close cooperation with both
sides of industry and be adopted early in l)ll, long before the present 4H" WV
policyexpires. This would not only pernit sorne degree of strmchronisation of
budgetary and incomes policies, but r*ou1d aLso avoid a period. of uncertainty
rrith its lossl.ble adverse effects on confid.ence both at horne and abroad.
The stance of monetary policy should be distinctly restrictive with
attention being focussed, in particular, on controlling the expansion cf domestic
credit whilst ensuring an adequate supply of funds to priority borrowers. fhe
authorities should aim to ensure that the money supplyr as broad"J.y defined.,
grows no faster tlnan I2/, in 1977.
V. CONCLUSIONS - 34 -
Since nid-1975, the Member States o:fl the Conmunity have achieved some
initial success in overcoming the worst :necession in the post-war period-.
Since the summer of 1975; with the d.ecli:ee of earlier expansive forcesr the
powerful upward tend.ency has given way tc a stead"ier economic trend. This
has reduced. the danger of too strong a brlom, but at the sarne tiroe ma4y
nember countries have seen the re-emergence of earlier disequilibria.
The labour market situation has inproved onl-y slowly. Balance of pa;rnents
d_eficits have increased, lnfLation rates are high and. the wide d.ivergences
in price and. cost trends between the mem-ber countries have remained. alnost
unchanged.. kchange rate relationships c,cntinue to be unstable.
fn sorne Mernber States, courageous p:rog"aJnmes have been introduced. or are
being drarrn up to overcome domestic and. externaL trade and. pa;rments d-isequilillria.
The success of these progranrnes will deternine the progress achieved in consollidation
the economic upswing and. in d.eveloping greater convergence in economic trends
within the Community. To postpone the necessary ad.justments any further would" be
to mafce the return to ful1 employment and. stability a1L the more d.ifficult and
painful.
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a) frlbcr of unelqrloJrscl pereons (as S of the civilian labolr,r rorce) (f )
(i) Scaeoaally adjurted sories except for ftaly : fSTAT figr::.es; as a result of disparities
of definition, d.ata cannot be compared. bel;ueen countries.
b) Vacancies (as S of tbe nraber of, uaeryIoyod pereone) (t)
(t) Seasoualty adjueted. series. Statistics no-b available for frelan6 and negligible
for ftaly and Luxen',bourg.
@: S.0.8.C. and Commissionrs .Departmeitts.
: Data not ava"ilab1e.
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TASLE 6
EKPENDIN]RE, RECEIPTS A][D NET BORROWII'IG REOIJIREMENT CF' CENTBAI,
COITERNIi{UTI
-
Erpenditure Recelpts Borrowing requlrement
fi dnange Value (1) as /o of G.D.P.
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I
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+23.2
I
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(t) *rousana nio. Xlkrl DItt, tr'fr, tire, Fl, Fb, Ftrg Mio f,.
(z) tgts/t6, L976h7.
Sourcer ComlsEiont s Departnents.
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TABLE 8
Monetary Devetopments
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(1) Notes and coin in circuIation(2) Year-to-year change: average(3) Money and near money.(4) Year-to-year change.(5) Day-to-day money rate, average(6) Average of period.
and sight deposits.
of month[y figures.
of period.
Last 36 months
Last 12 months
Last 3 months
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Last 36 months
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Z Annual rate of
or(M3) (3
ilcrease (
I li:i
I ;'-
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Short-term interest. rates ( 5)
lltJ
8.1
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415
412
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12,5
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6r6
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7.9
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8.8
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8r?
9,olorJ
9.1
LongJterfir' interest' rates (6)
Source : S.0.E.C. and nationaI statistics.
